The Family Farm: Regulating Farm Act Avoidance Techniques Through Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Production Contracting by Billings, Alan L.
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 16 
Number 2 Winter 1982 pp.277-317 
Winter 1982 
The Family Farm: Regulating Farm Act Avoidance Techniques 
Through Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Production 
Contracting 
Alan L. Billings 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alan L. Billings, The Family Farm: Regulating Farm Act Avoidance Techniques Through Restrictions on 
Vertical Integration and Production Contracting, 16 Val. U. L. Rev. 277 (1982). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss2/3 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
NOTES
THE FAMILY FARM: REGULATING FARM
ACT AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES THROUGH
RESTRICTIONS ON VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND
PRODUCTION CONTRACTING
INTRODUCTION
An evolving national economy has spawned a new entity in the
affairs of agriculture. The presence of integrated agribusiness' in
agricultural commodity production is as offensive to the traditional
family farmer as it is encouraging to advocates of centralized co-
ordinate systems of economy.2 While the existence of integrated
agribusiness was foretold,3 only recently have family farm advocates
reacted to the integrator's presence.
Those advocates determined to preserve the family farm ex-
pressed that determination through the enactment of "family farm
acts."' Eight states in the Great Plains now have such acts.5 These
1. Businesses engaged in the processing, storage, or distribution of farm sup-
plies and commodities are agribusinesses. Integration in the production of agricultural
commodities occurs when an agribusiness owns or controls other businesses in two or
more successive stages of the food production chain. Integration of the stage of com-
modity production is the focus of this paper. See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
2. Coordination in decision-making and operation of the businesses in the
various stages of production is the objective of the integrator. Under such a coor-
dinated system of production, central decision-making for the production, processing
and marketing of agricultural products is possible. See note 33 infra and accompanying
text.
3. As early as 1960 more than thirty percent of all livestock produced in this
country was produced under some form of vertical integration. COOPERATIVE EXTEN-
SION SERVICE, COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, SPECIAL PUBLICATION
27, WHO WILL CONTROL U.S. AGRICULTURE? 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHO WILL
CONTROL U.S. AGRICULTURE?].
4. The "family farm acts" are state laws that prevent various forms of cor-
porate involvement in agriculture. The purpose of the acts is to protect the family
farm unit through the corporate prohibition.
5. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 172C.1 to .15 (West Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1975);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-5901, to 02 (1974) (enacted in 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24
(West Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 350.010 to .030 (Vernon Supp.
1982) (enacted in 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-06-01 tb 06 (1976) (enacted in 1932);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 951-56 (West Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1971); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 47-9A-1 to 23 (Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1974); WIS. STAT. § 182.001 (West
Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1974).
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acts vary particularly in that some prohibit corporate involvement
in "farming"' while others prohibit corporate ownership of
agricultural land." Although the acts employ different means, their
common goal is to eliminate large corporations from agricultural
commodity production.
Notwithstanding the farm act promoters' intentions to protect
the family farm from corporate invasion, the acts have a significantly
limited practical impact.' Statutory avoidance techniques and ex-
plicit statutory exemptions for various types of corporations and for
specialized corporate agricultural activity9 allow for considerable
corporate involvement in commodity production. These exemptions,
however, do not vitiate the fundamental aim of the acts. That aim is
the preservation of the family farm as a basic economic and social
unit. The vertical integration of family farms, accomplished through
statutory avoidance techniques, must be prohibited if that purpose
is to be realized. 0
Vertical integration can eliminate the family farm through
either one of two means. Integration can be accomplished through
direct and formal corporate ownership of the farm or indirectly
through a production contract" with the family farmer, an arrange-
6. "Farming" is usually defined in the acts as the production of various
agricultural commodities. However, this definition does not encompass production via
the production contract. Consequently, employment of the production contract is not
"farming" and therefore is not prohibited by the acts. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §
500.23(2)(a) (West Supp. 1981).
7. The acts do contain exemptions for various corporations. The activities of
"family farm corporations" and "qualified corporations" are not prohibited by the acts.
The acts vary in their definitions of these corporations, but the definitions generally
restrict large corporations with substantial income from sources other than farming.
See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 350.010 (Vernon Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§
47-9A-14 to 15 (Supp. 1981).
8. A variety of statutory avoidance techniques limit the acts' effectiveness in
most circumstances. Morrison, State Corporate Farm Legislation, 7 U. TOL. L. REV.
961, 989 (1976).
9. Corporate activities in agricultural research and experimentation and in
raising certain specialty crops are exempted from the acts' coverage. IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 172C.1, 172C.4(3) (West Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 350.015(4) (Vernon Supp.
1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 954 (West Supp. 1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
47-9A-9 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 182.001(2)(d) (West Supp. 1981).
10. Integration, as defined in note 1 supra, is in reference to vertical integra-
tion. Horizontal integration, an expansion at the same stage of production, is not rele-
vant to this note.
11. Production contracts are contracts between the agribusiness and the family
farmer which specify the terms under which the farmer must produce the commodity.
See note 17 infra and accompanying text.
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ment which can relegate the family farm to that of an operating unit
of the agribusiness.12 Aside from the exempted corporations, the
family farm acts effectively restrict direct corporate ownership and
control of farms. Yet, the absence of restrictions on "indirect" cor-
porate control of farm production through the technique of produc-
tion contracting has led one writer to conclude that the significance
of the laws is limited to their symbolic character. 3
This note will first examine agribusiness vertical integration
through employment of production contracts. Legislative efforts to
curtail production contracting and potential constitutional challenges
to this legislation are then discussed. Government policies affecting
integration and production contracting and the effect of production
contracts upon the economic and social workings of the family farm
are considered. Finally, the family farm acts are analyzed for their
effectiveness in achieving their ostensible goals and a proposed
amendment to the acts is presented.
I. THE ELEMENTS OF THE PRODUCTION CONTRACT
The employment of a production contract creates the functional
equivalent to direct corporate ownership of the land and production
facilities and provides the same economic advantages to the in-
tegrator. For the integrator "there remains more than one way to
do the job.""' Where family farm acts with land ownership prohibi-
tions have been enacted, agribusiness integration is limited to the
use of production contracts. With the exception of a single provision
in Iowa's farm act, which specifically addresses vertical integration
and production contracting,15 the use of production contracts is wholly
unregulated by the state family farm acts.
12. To become an operating unit is to lose the independent decision-making
power that is characteristic of the family farmer. The farmer would merely operate his
farm in accordance with agribusiness directives. See generally Bayside Enterprises,
Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298 (1977).
13. The indirect techniques functionally provide agribusiness with the same
control over production that direct ownership would. Professor Morrison concludes
therefore, that the specific provisions of the laws are not significant, but rather the
laws are limited to a symbolic significance. Morrison, supra note 8, at 997.
14. Whether an agribusiness is expanded via contract or via direct ownership
of production facilities depends on the people involved and their particular needs,
desires, and capabilities. Both methods accomplish the goal of integration. L.
SCHRADER, EGG PRODUCTION CONTRACTS, 1975, at 4 (1975) (printed by the Department of
Agricultural Economics, Purdue University).
15. IOWA CODE ANN. § 172C.2 (West Supp. 1981). This provision is discussed
at length in note 56 infra and accompanying text.
1981]
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Production contracting involves a contract between a family
farmer and an agribusiness which specifies the terms under which
the farmer is to produce the commodity and the price to be paid for
the commodity."' Production contracts are usually made before pro-
duction begins, with contract provisions controlling the farm prac-
tices to be employed in producing the commodity." Both parties to
the contract expect to gain income or some other satisfaction, such as
the reduction of risk, from the contractual arrangement. The
agribusiness, by contracting, is essentially obtaining the use of the
farmer's land and production resources. In egg production contracts,
for instance, the farmer provides the hen house, equipment, utilities,
and requisite labor for caring for the hens and gathering the eggs. 8
The agribusiness provides the pullets, feed, medication, and service-
man assistance. 9
Besides controlling production inputs, the marketing of the com-
modity produced is also regulated by the contract. The marketing is
controlled by the agribusiness. The contract only implies that the
agribusiness will sell the product for whatever the agribusiness can
get.' Although the contract may be beneficial to the farmer, a long-
term contractual arrangement can tie the farmer's production and
operational decisions to the agribusinesses' desires.'
Variability in Contractual Arrangements
Although the production contract controls the terms of produc-
tion and the price and marketing of the product, contracts range from
those setting a flat fee for an agreed quantity of produce to ar-
rangements resembling joint ventures with production risks being
equally shared.' The contract can be varied according to the farmer's
16. SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, 96TH CONG., 2D
SESS., FARM STRUCTURE 80 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as FARM STRUCTURE].
17. The nature of production contracts requires some contractor involvement
in the farmer's operation. NATIONAL ECONOMICS DIVISION; ECONOMICS, STATISTICS, AND
CO-OPERATIVE SERVICE, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, STATUS OF THE FAMILY
FARM, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC REPORT No. 434, at 12 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
STATUS OF THE FAMILY FARM].
18. L. SCHRADER, supra note 14, at 5.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 8.
21. Rigid coordination between the production and processing stages is impor-
tant to the integrator because operational decisions at the production stage will affect
later processing and marketing stages. Consequently, the integrator seeks to control
production decisions in order to enhance coordination throughout the vertical chain of
production. See Morrison, supra note 8, at 991.
22. By the term joint venture, Professor Schrader is referring to the financial
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needs or according to the amount of risk the farmer can assume. For
example, the contract may transfer financial risk to the agribusiness
which the farmer would be unable to bear." In some instances the
contract may provide the opportunity to farm when it otherwise would
have been denied the farmer for financial reasons. Where the contrac-
ting parties want to share the returns in proportion to their in-
dividual contribution, full profit and loss sharing arragements have
been used.24 This type of contract arrangement has a built-in incen-
tive for the farmer to expend more fully his expertise and personal
care over the commodity. In this regard, the contract gives the
farmer the same economic incentive he had as an independent pro-
ducer. Integrating processors and marketers25 may also contract to
provide some of the farmers necessary debt capital." This feature
serves farmer interests by assuring a source of capital. It is also con-
venient to receive capital from the integrator since the farmer is then
less likely to have to seek other sources of financing.
Production contract arrangements serve the interests of the in-
tegrator just as they serve the farmer's interests. A production con-
tract with a farmer has the advantage of assuring the integrator that
a supply of products at a controlled price will be available. 7 A pre-
determined supply gives the integrator security and foreseeability
upon which to make processing and marketing decisions. Contractual
arrangement established in the production contract, not a joint venture status for tax
or legal liability purposes. L. SCHRADER, supra note 14, at 5.
23. Despite the potential decision making control that the contract may give
to the agribusiness, the properly designed contract can allow all parties to be better
off than without the contract. Id. at 2.
24. This arrangement provides for an initial estimate of the input from each
party which determines the initial share of returns. When the production contract is
terminated, the shares are recomputed and any appropriate adjustments are then
made. For instance, where the contract specifies returns based upon a definite feed
cost and the price of feed changes during the contract period, the final share for each
party is recomputed upon the changed costs. The method of calculating the various
costs must be known and agreed upon by all parties in advance. If the farmer is will-
ing and able to assume the risk of feed price fluctuations, he can also reap the benefits
if the fluctuation is in his favor. See generally L. SCHRADER, supra note 14, at 5-7.
25. Processors and marketers of farm commodities are the integrators most
responsible for the marketing structural changes occuring in agriculture through the
use of production contracts. See STATUS OF THE FAMILY FARM, supra note 17, at 9.
26. The integrator who provides the credit is generally better able to tap
debt capital markets than is the individual producer. FARM STRUCTURE, supra note 16,
at 80.
27. The production contract is advantageous to the integrator since he is
assured of supply and price without the burden of initial investments in production
resources. Morrison, supra note 8, at 991.
1981]
Billings: The Family Farm: Regulating Farm Act Avoidance Techniques Through
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1982
282 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 16
integration, unlike direct ownership integration, makes this coordina-
tion possible without forcing the integrator to expend capital
resources in land and machinery.
Another advantage of contract integration accrues through lower
labor costs to the integrator. The family producer often settles for
lower wages than the agribusiness would have to pay hired labor
had the production unit been directly owned.2" Production and
marketing coordination advantages under the single management of
direct ownership integration may be offset by these labor cost and
capital-investment savings under contractual integration. The
critical variables that the integrator must consider when choosing
one mode over the other are capital, the cost of labor and labor per-
formance.' The family farmer's livelihood as an independent pro-
ducer often depends upon his expertise and patient care in produc-
ing the commodity, a performance level which hired labor, becaue no
incentives exist for being responsible, may not achieve. These fac-
tors suggest that the contract fully serves the integrator's interest
and that the integrator is not disadvantaged when family farm acts
prohibit direct farm ownership.
II. ACCOMPLISHING VERTICAL INTERGRATION
THROUGH PRODUCTION CONTRACTING
To understand the integrator's interest in controlling farm pro-
duction, it is important to recognize his interest in coordinating the
stages of food production. Agricultural commodities pass through
five vertical stages in the food production chain. Each stage of pro-
duction is an operating process with a potential market, since each
stage is capable of producing a salable product or service. The five
28. Managers of the integrated unit have had varied experiences regarding
labor performance. Some managers desire hired labor while others find the family
farmer's labor performance more preferable. One criticism leveled at contract farming
is that the farmer is in effect made an employee of the integrator. Unless the contract
gives the family farmer incentive to perform as he did as an independent producer, his
performance may be no better than hired labor. See generally STATUS OF THE FAMILY
FARM, supra note 17, at 11; L. SCHRADER, note 14 supra.
29. L. SCHRADER, supra note 14, at 3-4.
30. MIGHELL & JONES, VERTICAL COORDINATION IN AGRICULTURE,
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC REPORT No. 19 (Economic Research Service, United States
Department of Agriculture 1963); cited in L. SCHRADER, PRICING PROBLEMS IN THE FOOD
INDUSTRY: BROILER CHICKENS AND EGGS 1 (1978) (Symposium on Pricing Problems in the
Food Industry, March 2-3, 1978, Washington, D.C.) (printed by the Department of
Agricultural Economics, Purdue University).
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vertical stages are: (1) input of raw materials and production
resources (feed, seed, machinery, equipment, energy); (2) commodity
production (planting, cultivating, crop harvesting, livestock husban-
dry); (3) production adjuncts (insecticides and herbicides, medicines,
vaccines, irrigation); (4) handling and processing (transportation,
storage, transformation of commodity to a consumable form); and (5)
marketing and distribution (location and selection of buyers, sale,
delivery of commodity)."
Vertical integration occurs when an agribusiness links, either
through ownership or control, businesses in two or more successive
stages of the food production chain.32 The vertical integrator's objec-
tive in employing the production contract is to control, and
therefore, closely coordinate, successive stages. When production
on the family farm is controlled via the production contract, the
farm is "integrated" since farm production decisions are closely
coordinate with decisions in the processing and marketing stages.2
This centralized decision coordination minimizes production and
market risks, protects against supply shortages by coordinating out-
put with market demand, and takes advantage of production and
market technologies. Long standing contractual arrangements also
provide advantages in assembling and distributing the product.
31. E. Roy, CONTRACT FARMING AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 (1972), cited in
Brown, United States v. National Broiler Marketing Ass " Will the Chicken Lickin'
Stand?, 56 N.C.L. REV. 29 (1978).
32. This definition assumes that production contracts afford enough co-
ordinating power to the agribusiness to bring the production stage under the control
of the agribusiness. Without being brough under the control of the integrating
agribusiness, there is no vertical integration. See FARM STRUCTURE, supra note 16, at
80.
33. Without the coordination made possible by the production contract, the
production stage would remain an independent stage in the food production chain.
Brown, United States v. National Broiler Marketing Ass'" Will the Chicken Lickin'
Stand?, 56 N.C.L. REV. 29, 33 (1978).
34. Although an intermediate stage between commodity production and com-
modity processing has been identified, see note 31 supra and accompanying text, in-
tegration nevertheless occurs when production is coordinated with processing, though
not successive stages. This is possible because the processor who contracts with a
farmer often has previously integrated firms dealing with production adjuncts. The
production contract often specifies that the integrator is to supply some of these pro-
duction adjuncts to the farmer. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
35. See Brown, supra note 33, at 56.
36. L. SCHRADER, PRICING PROBLEMS IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY: BROILER CHICKENS
AND EGGS 11 (1978) (Symposium on Pricing Problems in the Food Industry, March 2-3,
1978, Washington, D.C.) (printed by the Department of Agricultural Economics, Pur-
due University).
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The combination of these factors may increase the efficiency of the
food production chain.
Prior to being integrated, each stage of production has the
potential to generate a market, since there is an intermediate pro-
duct at each stage. 7 The integrator seeks to eliminate these "open
spot markets" through the close coordination of the integrated
system." Integrated coordination allows transfer of intermediate
products from stage to stage without going through the open
market and without exposure to the risks inherent therein. Conse-
quently, farm commodities produced under contract are transferred
to the processor. Buying from a processor avoids the need to pur-
chase the products in the open market from the farmer.
The decline of traditional open market transactions has
disfavored small family farmers. The replacement of these farm
markets with the contract marketing technique favors larger pro-
ducers. This results from the inability of small farmers to produce
the minimum volume of most commodities needed to encourage an
integrator to contract.3' As a result, small farmers may have diffi-
culty finding market outlets if traditional markets continue to
decline in favor of contractual arrangements.0
The marketing and production advantages that accrue to
agribusiness through avoiding open market transactions41 have
resulted in an increasing volume of agricultural products produced
37. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
38. "Open Spot Markets" refers to the intermediate markets at each stage of
production where the buying and selling of goods is done by negotiation between in-
terested parties. The integrator seeks to eliminate these markets because negotiation
involves risk, the risk that the final negotiated price for the product will be less than
the negotiator expected. The open market can also determine priority among products
with marketers vying for those products that are demanded the most by consumers. A
change in consumer preference entails risk to the producer since he may also be forced
to change to meet new consumer demands. The food production integrator who is in-
tegrated from the producer to the retailer is in a better position to avoid the risks of
consumer change. This results from the producer-to-retailer integrator's ability to
manipulate the market so that the consumer is inundated with a cheap, available pro-
duct, a condition that may dissuade change in consumer preference. Cf. L. SCHRADER,
note 36 supra (Professor Schrader concedes that the broiler market is susceptible to
market manipulation and that inegrators realize the positive external benefits of the
open market pricing process though seeking to avoid that market).
39. STATUS OF THE FAMILY FARM, supra note 17, at 10.
40. Id.
41. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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under contract.'2 Decisionmaking in the production process continues
to shift to integrators and away from farmers as larger amounts of
farm commodities are produced under contract. Arguably the role of
a greater number of farmers resembles that of an agricultural
laborer.'3 It is noteworthy that the farmer's actual ownership of the
land has done little to deter the shift of decisionmaking power to the
integrator." The integrator's access to the market is a more impor-
tant economic factor than who owns the land.
5
Even though the family farm acts insure that land ownership will re-
main in the farmer, that ownership is meaningless in protecting the
farmer's independent decisionmaking power. Yet it is precisely the
farmer's independence that the farm acts seek to preserve. The acts'
promoters are determined that the family farm should remain in-
42. ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF OUTPUT PRODUCED UNDER CONTRACT AND VER-
TICAL INTEGRATION IN 1960 and 1970.
Commodity 1960 1970
Crops
Feed Grains .5 .6
Food Grains 3.0 2.5
Fresh Vege bles 45.0 51.0
Processing Vegetables 75.0 95.0
Potatoes and Sweetpotatoes 70.0 70.0
Citrus Fruits 80.0 85.0
Dry Beans and Peas 36.0 2.0
Other Fruits and Nuts 35.0 40.0
Sugar Beets 100.0 100.0
Sugar Cane 100.0 100.0
Cotton 8.0 12.0
Livestock
Fed Cattle 13.0 22.0
Sheep and Lambs 4.0 10.0
Hogs 1.4 2.0
Fluid-grade milk 98.0 98.0
Manufacturing-grade milk 27.0 26.0
Eggs 15.0 40.0
Broilers 98.0 97.0
Turkeys 34.0 54.0
WHO WILL CONTROL U.S. AGRICULTURE?, supra note 3, at 8.
43. See note 28 supra.
44. Decision-making in the production process has largely shifted away from
the person who provides the labor and housing to the integrator of the whole process.
Ownership of land has had little role in the shift in control, nor has it been affected
much by the change in the organization of agriculture. Proposed Amendment to the
Clayton Act: Hearings on S.334 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrus4 Monopoly and
Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 314 (1979)
(statement of Bob F. Jones) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S.334].
45. Id.
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dependent to continue fostering virtues central to American life."6
Without farm independence, these virtues are jeopardized. Conse-
quently, until the issue of contract farming is statutorily addressed,
attributes of family farming will be afforded little protection.
III. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS AT CONSTRAINING
VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND PRODUCTION CONTRACTING
It is recognized that social and economic attributes of family
farming are threatened by production contract integration. This
recognition has generated isolated bits of legislation directed at in-
tegration curtailment. Iowa's family farm act47 and the Family Farm
Antitrust Act of 1979 " are two such attempts. This legislation seeks
to restrict integrators' production and marketing choices. Choices
which may be "economically optimal" under existing economic condi-
tions."9 If one disregards market inputs from without the "free
market" which helped create existing market forces' and ignores
the economic and social externalities that will accompany continued
promulgation of these forces,51 one may conclude that this legislation
restricts optimal free market choices. Nevertheless, because the
legislation imposes economic costs by restricting economic choice, it
may have to justify itself through its social ends and through its
elimination of the anticompetitive effects of vertical integration."
The Iowa family farm act 53 pursues both of these goals. Iowa
46. One of this country's precious resources is its pool of independent
farmers. The family farm is an environment in which the central virtues of American
life are fostered. It is a business, a job, and a set of family relationships. It does not
provide an easy life but it provides a good life, and one in which independence, in-
dustry, hard work, foresight, cooperation, and other qualities central to America's
needs are fostered. For most of our history, the family farm has been the seedbed of
our culture. Nelson, Forward to W. GOLDSCHMIDT, As You Sow at vii (1978).
47. IOWA CODE ANN. § 172C.1 (West Supp. 1981).
48. Hearings on S. 334, supra note 44, at 5.
49. The legislation is characterized as "political" since it impinges upon deci-
sions which some entrepreneurs think most favorable in the "free market." Economists
who argue that this is a per se reason for objecting to the legislation take no account
of the variables discussed in note 139 infra and accompanying text. See generally Mor-
rison, supra note 8, at 962.
50. See note 131 infra and accompanying text.
51. See note 158 infra and accompanying text.
52. The state farm acts and federal legislative proposals are entirely consis-
tent in their goals. Both specifically seek to preserve the family farm and also to pre-
vent monopoly, protect consumers, and preserve free and private enterprise. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24(1) (West Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 172C.2 (West Supp.
1981); Hearings on S. 334, supra note 44, at 5-6.
53. IOWA CODE ANN. § 172C.1 (West Supp. 1981).
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has the only state farm act which specifically addresses the issue of
production contracting and attempts to restrict its use. The Kansas
farm act,' may restrict contract farming though no provision par-
ticularly enunciates that objective. The Kansas statute simply pro-
vides that "[n]o corporation shall directly or indirectly engage in the
agricultural or horticultural business of producing, planting, raising,
harvesting, or gathering .. . ."" Ostensibly, this statute prohibits
all production contracting since production contracting is an indirect
means of farm production.
The Iowa act has a narrower application than the Kansas act.
The Iowa act enumerates specific limits upon production contract ar-
rangements. Iowa's farm act seeks to ensure the family farmer some
independent marketing choice by regulating livestock delivery
terms. The statute provides "where the contract sets a date for
delivery which is more than twenty days after the making of the
contract it shall . .. specify the month for the delivery, and shall
allow the farmer to set the week for the delivery within such month
and processor . . .to set the date for delivery within such week.' 'H
This section obviously does not prohibit production contract use en-
tirely. Rather, the farmer is insured some decisionmaking freedom
regarding the marketing of the product, notwithstanding the produc-
tion contract. In this regard, the provision is an inroad into the in-
tegrator's overriding market power."7
The Iowa provision is a compromise. It maintains existing pro-
duction and marketing relations but infuses into those relations
marketing power in the farmer's favor. In the absence of this provi-
sion, the integrator could specify any date for the farmer's delivery
of the produce. Presumably the integrator would choose a day when
the price was low, thus paying the farmer less. By requiring the in-
tegrator to set the month for delivery in advance, while allowing the
farmer to choose the week for delivery, the risk of market price
54. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-5901 (1974).
55. Id.
56. IOWA CODE ANN. § 172C.2 (West Supp. 1981).
57. Decision-making power in commodity production has shifted to the in-
tegrator notwithstanding the farmer's actual ownership of the land. This results from
the integrator's access to the market, a factor far more important than who owns the
land. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. Also, the marketing of the product is
generally controlled by the integrator under the production contract. See note 20
supra and accompanying text. The Iowa provision gives the farmer some marketing
choice by mandating the delivery terms and in doing so returns to the farmer some
decision making and marketing power.
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fluctuation falls upon both parties. 8 While long-range forseeability
of market fluctuation is a factor which may favor the integrator, this
advantage is partially offset by the farmer's choice of delivery week.
The farmer's decision casts the weekly price fluctuation risk upon
both parties, thereby distributing a risk that otherwise would be
forced upon the farmer by the integrator's arbitrary choice of
delivery. Although the provision allows the integrator to set the
delivery day, this affords little advantage. In a long-term arrange-
ment where the day of delivery is set in advance, daily price
forseeability may be so limited that the integrator's choice is mean-
ingless. The total provision denies the integrator, by imposing
market price risks upon the integrator as well as the farmer, its
prior ability to despoil farmer profits. As such, the provision is an
important first step in reallocating marketing power.
Notwithstanding this farmer-oriented provision, the Iowa act
fully permits long-term production contracting. The act permits the
integrator to choose between the above provision 9 and one which
allows the integrator alone to set the delivery date. The alternative
provision states, "where . . .delivery which is more than twenty
days after the making of the contract the contract shall . . . [s]pecify
a calendar day for delivery of the livestock."' Since this clause re-
quires the setting of a specific delivery date, it incorporates some of
the advantage of the alternate provision. The integrator can not
force the farmer to market his livestock at the integrator's whim,
presumably when the price is low. Under this provision the in-
tegrator must assume the risk that the price will be high on the
date chosen. Assuming equal bargaining power in setting the calen-
dar date for delivery, both parties share the risk of price fluctuation
equally. This assumes too much, however, considering the in-
tegrator's overriding market power and his regular employment of
form contracts."1 Consequently, if the integrator chooses this alter-
58. This discussion assumes that the price to be paid for the produce under
the contract is determined by the open market price on the day of delivery.
59. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
60. The Iowa provision which directly addresses the issue of integration
regulates only the cattle and hog business. The general provisions of the act address
the production of agricultural crops, the production of eggs, milk, fruit or other hor-
ticultural crops, the raising of poultry, and the grazing of livestock. The act prohibits
direct integration in all of these commodities but regulates "indirect" integration only
in cattle and hog production. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 172C.1, .2, .4 (West Supp. 1981).
61. Even if the integrator chooses the provision whereby the farmer may set
the week for delivery, this positive decision-making power means little when the in-
tegrator's form contract otherwise precludes genuine negotiation. See generally Mor-
rison, supra note 8, at 991.
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native, no positive marketing or decisionmaking power is given to
the Iowa family farmer. The. provisions only effect is to allocate
price fluctuation risk to both parties. Moreover, since both alter-
natives address only the issue of the integrator's marketing control,
the standards and requirements for the husbandry of the livestock
may still be contractually controlled by the integrator.
Although Iowa's total integration provision does not confer
much positive marketing power on the farmer, it at least addresses
the issue of direct integration through ownership of feedlots in
which hogs and cattle are fed for slaughter. The -statute declares
that "it is unlawful for any processor of beef or pork ... to own, con-
trol, or operate a feedlot in Iowa in which hogs or cattle are fed for
slaughter."62 "Control" or "operation" does not preclude indirect con-
trol through the use of production contracts." Neither does "opera-
tion" prevent processors from owning and operating facilities to pro-
vide normal care and feeding of livestock "for a period not to exceed
ten days immediately prior to slaughter, or for a longer period in an
emergency." 4 But, direct and formal integration is precluded. This
assures that actual ownership of land and production facilities re-
main in the farmer. This is an important initial step in guaranteeing
farm independence since it would be ineffectual to restrict contrac-
ting without restricting direct integration.
Since restrictions on direct integration are prerequisite to
meaningful restrictions on indirect integration, the utility of
Oklahoma's farm act"5 is doubtful. The agribusinesses most apt to
engage in production contracting are exempted from the Oklahoma
act's restrictions on direct integration. Oklahoma's agribusinesses
need not expend any entrepreneurial ingenuity in developing in-
direct techniques in order to integrate. The act's restrictions on
direct ownership of agricultural lands "[do] not apply to corporations
engaging in food canning operations, food processing, or frozen food
62. See note 56 supra.
63. See note 56 supra and accompanying text. Indirect control is specifically
addressed in a separate provision. The provision neither affords much positive decision
making power to the farmer nor does it deprive the integrator of much control over
the farmer's production and marketing decisions.
64. IOWA CODE ANN. § 172C.2(2) (West Supp. 1981). Livestock processing re-
quires holding pens for the care and feeding of the stock until it can be slaughtered
and processed. This provision accounts for that necessity. The ten day maximum
holding period insures that the processor is not using the facilities for the actual fat-
tening of the livestock, an activity prohibited by the act. The practical application of
the provision is to mandate a complete turnover in stock every ten days.
65. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 951 (West Supp. 1981).
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processing insofar as such corporations engage in the raising of food
products' for aforesaid purposes."" This clause invites direct
agribusiness integration into the production facet of agriculture,
eliminating the agribusinesses' need to employ production contracts.
To the contrary, the Iowa act avoids this incongruous result by in-
itially prohibiting direct integration and then further restricting, at
least minimally, the use of production contracts.
In addition to its restriction on direct integration and produc-
tion contracting, the Iowa act contains a provision requiring divest-
ment of unlawfully held property. 7 This provision applies retro-
actively. Any processor that owned, controlled, or operated a feedlot
on the date of the statute's enactment is given ten years in which to
divest itself of the property. This clause, like a very similar one in
North Dakota's farm act," raises questions of the deprivation of
property without due process of law. The North Dakota act was con-
stitutionally challenged on due process grounds and subsequently
met the test. The United States Supreme Court in Ashbury Hospital
v. Cass County9 held that a state's power to limit the nature of cor-
porate business conducted in the state does not cease once the cor-
poration has acquired real property within that state."' The four-
teenth amendment's due process clause7' requires only that the cor-
66. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 953(c) (West Supp. 1981).
67. The Iowa act, which became effective on August 15, 1975, provides that
"[any processor or limited partnership which owns, controls, or operates a feedlot on
August 15, 1975 shall have until July 1, 1985 to dispose of the property." IOWA CODE
ANN. § 172C.2(2) (West Supp. 1981).
68. The North Dakota act provides:
[Alll corporations, both domestic and foreign, which now own or hold
rural real estate which was acquired prior to July 29, 1932, and which is
used or usable for farming or agriculture, except such as is reasonably
necessary in the conduct of their business, shall dispose of the same on or
before July 29, 1942, and said corporations may farm and use said real
estate for agricultural purposes until such date. The ownership limitation
provided by this section shall be deemed a covenant running with the ti-
tle to the land against any grantee, successor, or assignee of a corpora-
tion, which is also a corporation.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-02 (1976).
69. 326 U.S. 207 (1945). Ashbury Hospital, a Minnesota non-profit corporation
owning farm land in North Dakota, sought a declaratory judgment that the North
Dakota act's divestment provision was unconstitutional.
70. The Court stated; "a state's power ... to limit the nature of the business
[the foreign corporation] may conduct within the state, does not end as soon as the cor-
poration has lawfully entered the state and there acquired immovable property. Subse-
quent legislation excluding such a corporation from continuing in the state has been
sustained as an exercise of ... general power ... " Id. at 211-12.
71. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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poration "is afforded a fair opportunity to realize the value of the
land, and that the sale, when required, is to be under conditions
reasonably calculated to realize its value at the time of sale."7' Since
North Dakota's divestment requirement was upheld in Ashbury
Hospital, Iowa's identical provision is valid. This insures that
feedlots directly integrated in the future, in Iowa and those pre-
viously integrated will be disbanded.
A state's ability to force property divestiture and to generally
regulate economic activity within its borders was recently affirmed
in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland.78 The due process clause
was interpreted as not giving the judiciary power to act as a
"superlegislature" to weigh the economic wisdom of legislation."
The Court found that regardless of the ultimate economic efficacy of
a statute, if it "bears a reasonable relationship to the state's
legitimate purpose," it passes any due process challenge.7 ' The Iowa
act, unlike its North Dakota counterpart, has not been challenged on
due process grounds. Nevertheless, it certainly meets the standards
set forth in Ashbury Hospital and Exxon Corp. The act prescribes a
ten year divestment period, a fair opportunity for integrators to
"realize the value of the land." The act's divestment provision and
contract restrictions bear a reasonable relationship to the state's
purpose of protecting the family farmer.
IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO
REGULATE PRODUCTION CONTRACTING
It has been suggested that all state family farm legislation is
destined to be short-lived.7 ' It is argued that the larger, more
72. Ashbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. at 212-13.
73. 437 U.S. 117 (1978). The Exxon case, although not dealing with the divest-
ment of farm land, exemplifies a state's ability to regulate economic activities within
its borders and to force divestment of property without violating the due process
clause. Exxon Corp., a gas producer and refiner, owned thirty-six gas stations in
Maryland. During the 1973 shortage of petroleum, gasoline stations operated by pro-
ducers and refiners had received preferential treatment of the short supply. Maryland,
in response, passed a statute designed to correct the inequities in the distribution and
pricing of gasoline. The Maryland statute required gasoline producers and.refiners to
discontinue operating retail gasoline stations within the state.
74. The Court stated that "[t]he evidence presented by the refiners may cast
some doubt on the wisdom of the statute, but it is, by now, absolutely clear that the
due process clause does not empower the judiciary to sit as a superlegislaure to weigh
the wisdom of legislation." Id. at 124.
75. Id. at 125.
76. Professor Morrison suggests that the family farmer is following the same
line of defense in promulgating family farm acts as small businesses pursued in enac-
ting regulations such as the chain-store tax. The chain-store tax was intended to pro-
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"economically efficient" agribusiness can produce cheaper
agricultural commodities and that consumers will eventually force
repeal of the acts. The integrator's economic efficiency, however,
may be the result of the monopolistic effect of integration.77 Because
the state farm acts may be "short-lived," they are perhaps an inap-
propriate vehicle for confronting this potential monopoly.
These monopolistic tendencies"8 are ostensibly regulated by the
Clayton Act."9 This federal antitrust legislation is not applicable to
the monopolistic situation of integrated agribusiness, however."0
Because this federal antitrust legislation is inapplicable and state
family farm legislation may be "short-lived," federal legislators have
sought other means for protecting the family farmer.
One attempt to protect the family farmer was Senator James
Abourezk's proposed amendment to the Clayton Act which
specifically addressed vertical integration and indirect control of
farm production." Although this amendment was rejected, it would
tect small business from the developing national chain store. Political pressures and
avoidance techniques led to the eventual repeal of the chain-store tax. Professor Mor-
rison is suggesting that if integrated agribusiness is a more efficient way of producing
food than the family farm unit, consumers demanding lower food prices could force
repeal of the family farm acts. See Morrison, supra note 8, at 994.
77. Senator Abourezk contends that integration in the agricultural industry
by corporations involved in the processing, distributing, or retailing of the agricultural
commodity, tends to create monopolies. See Abourezk, Agriculture, Antitrust and
Agribusiness: A Proposal For Federal Action, 20 S.D.L. REv. 499, 499-500 (1975).
78. Integration tends to create monopolies because traditional open markets
are eliminated by integration. The small farmer who has neither the production con-
tract nor the open market may find that no outlet for his produce exists. Consequent-
ly, unless the small farmer produces the minimum volume of a commodity needed to
attract a contractor, he will be forced out of business. As small farmers are forced out
of business, production and marketing correspondingly concentrate under the in-
tegrator's central control. The tendency for monopoly is spawned in that centralized
production and marketing control. See generally STATUS OF THE FAMILY FARM, supra
note 17, at 10, 18. For a discussion of the integrator's marketing and production power
in the broiler and egg business, see note 88 infra and accompanying text.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1973).
80. The Clayton Act does not apply to integrated agriculture because it fails
to regulate indirect control of farm production through production contracts or the
leasing of farm property. To compensate for the deficiency of the Clayton Act, Senator
Abourezk proposed a bill to amend that act. That bill specifically addressed direct and
indirect integration of the family farm. See Abourezk, supra note 77, at 503.
81. The restrictive provisions of Senator Abourezk's proposed amendment
are as follows:
[N]o person engaged in commerce (or affecting commerce) in a business
other than farming, whose nonfarming business assets exceed $3,000,000,
shall (1) engage directly or indirectly in farming or the production of
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have filled the gap between the existing state family farm acts and
federal antitrust laws. The Family Farm Antitrust Act of 1979,82 also
introduced as an amendment to the Clayton Act, was similar to the
bill introduced by Senator Abourezk. The nurture of private enter-
prise, the protection of consumers and small business (including the
family farmer), and the prevention of monopolies and an-
ticompetitive trade practice in the agricultural industry were cited
in support of the amendment." The amendment sought to ac-
complish these goals by prohibiting all persons "engaged in com-
merce (or affecting commerce) in a business other than farming,
whose nonfarming business assets exceed $15,000,000 . .. [to] con-
trol, or attempt to control, directly or indirectly, the production of
raw farm products through ownership or long-term leasing of
agricultural land."84 Like its counterpart in the states, it exempted
from its prohibitions cooperatives, agricultural research and ex-
perimental businesses, land acquired for non agricultural develop-
ment and integrated producers who are engaged in production on
the date of enactment. 5
For all practical purposes these federal proposals provide no
greater protection to the family farmer than existing state farm
acts. If anything, these amendments would allow greater access to
farm production by large corporate farms and non-farm businesses.8
agricultural products, (2) control, or attempt to control, agricultural pro-
duction through the ownership or leasing of land for agricultural pur-
poses, or (3) participate in farming through corporate integration or
merger, or by any other means of acquisition or control of another person
who is engaged in farming.
Abourezk, supra note 77, at 512.
82. Hearings on S. 334, supra note 44, at 5.
83. These considerations are noted in the amendment's findings and declara-
tion of policy. Id. at 5, 6.
84. Id. at 7.
85. Only the Iowa act, IOWA CODE ANN. § 172C.2 (West Supp. 1981), and the
North Dakota act, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-02 (1976), require divestment of
agricultural land held by the corporation on the effective date of the act. The re-
mainder of the state farm acts allow for continued corporate holding of land acquired
before the act's enactment. For example, Wisconsin's farm act provides that
this section [on corporate restrictions] does not apply to land: 1. Owned
by a corporation on the effective date of this act. 2. Acquired by a cor-
poration in the normal expansion of land owned by the corporation and
used for agricultural purposes on the effective date of this act, provided
that such expansion does not increase the acreage of such land by more
than 20% in any 5-year period.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 182.001(2)(c) (West Supp. 1981).
86. For instance, the Family Farm Antitrust Act of 1979 would require only
sixty percent of the producer's gross income to be proceeds from farming, whereas the
state farm acts typically require sixty-five to eighty percent of gross income to be
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These amendments are significant, however, because they
represents an alternative approach to the problem of integration.
The emphasis of these federal proposals is upon the anticompetitive
and monopolistic tendencies of integration. Although the Justice
Department may be reluctant to enforce such legislation, 7 the
breaking up of agricultural monopolies is perhaps a more acceptable
justification for prohibiting integration than the state farm acts'
social goals in preserving the farm family. Even though the objec-
tive of federal and state legislation is the same, consumers and
legislators may be more responsive to economic arguments and the
threat of monopoly than to sociological arguments concerning the
threatened nuclear farm family.
V. THE EFFECT OF INTEGRATION UPON THE MARKET
Regardless of whether state or federal law proves more accept-
able in prohibiting agribusiness integration, both seek to protect the
family farmer from the integrator's concentrated market power. The
egg production and broiler business aptly exemplify the effect of in-
tegration upon the market. The producers in the 384 plants which
produced a substantial portion of all eggs in the United States
universally desired not to participate in the open market." These
producers view integration as a means of avoiding the "market im-
perfections" associated with openly negotiated prices. Integration in
egg production exists in some cases from the producer to the
retailer." The producer-to-retailer integrator eliminates all potential
farming proceeds. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24(2Xd)(4) (West Supp. 1979). The
$15,000,000 asset limitation is considered to be so high that substantial non-farming in-
terests would have access to farm production. Also, the bill is not likely to stop the
decline in farm numbers or the continued concentration of land into larger units.
Because of its major exclusions, it would not stop large family farm operations from
getting larger nor would it stop integration in livestock production where control
shifts to the integrator without direct control over land. See Hearings on S.334, supra
note 44, at 316, 329.
87. The federal legislation would not be more effective in restricting integra-
tion than the state farm acts. The Justice Department is less likely to initiate a suit
under the federal legislation until the alleged conduct reaches a stage where the suit
will be successful. At that point numerous family farmers have incurred damage. Also,
because the market for agricultural products is broadly delineated, even a notable
trend toward concentration might not be considered anticompetitive. See Abourezk,
supra note 77, at 504.
88. "The fundamental problem of pricing eggs is the almost universal desire .
by firms not to participate in the open market. Marketing (viewed by the individual)
is the antithesis of selling a homogeneous product in an open and 'perfect market'." L.
SCHRADER, supra note 36, at 5, 6.
89. Id. at 2.
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intermediate markets" where exchange could .have been made on a
negotiated basis. The loss of these open competitive markets is
reflected in the integrator's ability to manipulate prices in what is
essentially a "non-price coordinated system.""1 This coordinated
system not only affords the potential for price manipulation, but
definitely impedes market access for independent producers."' In the
egg and broiler business, this is the result of the use of production
contracts and long standing production arrangements.93 The an-
ticompetitive effect of contractual integration is manifested by the
farmer's inability to find a market for his produce.
In egg production, this highly integrated "non-price" system is
developed to the point where there is no longer an open market
capable of generating a quotable market price.9' With the open
market extinguished, the prospective broiler farmer's entrance and
continued independence in the market is not-protected. Indeed, the
loss of independent access to a market is so pervasive that if the
farmer wishes to sell broilers he must do so through a fixed price
contract or not at all.95 It is precisely this situation that the state
farm acts seek to prevent.
Because the state acts can be circumvented through indirect
production under a production contract, federal legislators sought to
fill this gap with agricultural antitrust measures. Senator
Abourezk's proposal and the Family Farm Antitrust Act of 1979
both addressed the issue of indirect farm production. However,
these measures did not muster enough support to become law.
Perhaps the most feasible means of restricting integration is to
amend the existing state farm acts with provisions specifically ad-
dressed to contract farming. Amendments to the state acts are
justified on the basis of preventing monopoly. Preventing monopoly
90. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
91. This terminology is used to describe the integrated method of transfer-
ring goods from one stage to another. Transfer prices under the production contract
are determined by formula, not on a negotiated basis. Without the open market, the
ability to manipulate the price of goods is enhanced. Such manipulation can occur in
the egg and broiler business. See generally L. SCRADER, supra note 36, at 3, 10.
92. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
93. L. SCHRADER, supra note 36, at 10.
94. Id. at 3.
95. The chicken farmer is no longer protected by competitive bidding in the
marketplace. If a farmer wants to sell chicken, he must sell to a corporation through a
contract with a fixed formula price or not at all. Role of Giant Corporations: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business,
92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 3693 (1971-1972) (statement of Harrison Welford).
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may increase the state acts' overall credibility by providing a basis
that is not "short-lived." Since the state legislators' original intent
was to prevent situations like that in the egg industry, amendments
presumably would be supported. 8
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO FAMILY FARM LEGISLATION
A. Due Process And Equal Protection Challenges
Although the existing state farm acts, with the exception of
Iowa and Kansas, do not restrict production contract integration,
preventing the effects of integration is unquestionably their goal.
This goal is expressed in the farm acts' declarations of policy. The
policies are stated as preserving economic and moral stability,97 pro-
tecting consumers, preserving free and private enterprise and
preventing monopoly,98 and promoting the well-being of rural soci-
ety." Because the acts' promoters have declared their intent and
have attempted to execute that intent by restricting agribusiness
growth, the acts quite expectedly have been subjected to constitu-
tional challenge.
The first family farm act"' was opposed on equal protection
and due process grounds. The North Dakota act met both challenges
in Ashbury Hospital v. Cass County.' The equal protection claim
stemmed from the right of cooperative corporations'01 to own farm
96. The author has proposed such an amendment. It is directed toward
preventing the monopolistic and anticompetitive effects of integration. I believe this
approach toward restricting integration will find more support than the federal anti-
trust approach. See Appendix.
97. "The Legislature of the state of South Dakota recognizes the importance
of the family farm to the economic and moral stability of the state, and the legislature
recognizes that the existence of the family farm is threatened by conglomerates in
farming." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-9A-1 (Supp. 1981).
98. "In order to preserve free and private enterprise, prevent monopoly, and
protect consumers, it is unlawful for any processor . . . to own, control, or operate a
feedlot in Iowa in which hogs or cattle are fed for slaughter." IOWA CODE ANN. §
172C.2 (West Supp. 1981).
99. The legislature finds that it is in the interests of the state to encourage
and protect the family farm as a basic economic unit, to insure it as the most socially
desirable mode of agricultural production, and to enhance and promote the stability
and well-being of rural society in Minnesota and the nuclear family. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 500.24(1) (West Supp. 1981).
100. The North Dakota family farm act, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-01 (1976)
(enacted in 1932), served as the prototype for the remainder of the state farm acts, all
enacted between 1971 and 1975. See note 5 supra.
101. 326 U.S. 207 (1945).
102. The single exemption in the North Dakota act allows cooperative corpora-
tions to own farm land and engage in farming. The exemption nevertheless insures
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land while prohibiting all other corporations from doing so.' 3 The
Court held that the test of validity for equal protection "is not
whether the classes differ but whether the differences between
them are pertinent to the subject with respect to which the
classification is made.""'' The Court reasoned that statutory
discrimination between classes which are in fact different, is
"presumed to be relevant to a permissible legislative purpose and is
not ... a denial of equal protection if any state of facts could be con-
ceived which would support it."'0 5
Ashbury Hospital is an important holding because it insures
the continued validity of the state farm acts under the equal protec-
tion clause. The acts have exemptions for cooperatives, family farm
corporations, or some form of qualified corporation.' 0 With these
special classifications, the existing acts are vulnerable to the equal
protection challenge. Nevertheless, all the acts should meet that
challenge under the Ashbury Hospital analysis because the classes
exempted in all the acts are similar to the class upheld in Ashbury
Hospital. The exempted classes are similar in their purpose to
restrict ownership of agricultural land to the individuals who actual-
ly work the land and produce the commodity with their own labor.
The classes exempted "are in fact different" and the "differences
between them are pertinent to the subject with respect to which the
classification is made."'0 7 Cooperatives, family farm corporations, and
that non-farm interests are not permitted to engage in farming or own farm land. The
provision states, "nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit cooperative
corporations, seventy-five percent of whose members or stockholders are actual
farmers residing on farms or depending principally on farming for their livelihood,
from acquiring real estate and engaging in cooperative farming or agriculture." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-06-04 (1976).
103. "All corporations, both domestic and foreign, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this chapter, are hereby prohibited from engaging in the business of farming
or agriculture." Id. at § 10-06-01.
104. Ashbury. Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. at 214.
105. Id. at 215.
106. A qualified corporation is typically defined as
a corporation meeting the following standards: (1) Its shareholders do not
exceed five in number; (2) All its shareholders, other than any estate, are
natural persons; (3) It does not have more than one class of shares; and (4)
Its revenues from rent, royalties, dividends, interest and annuities does
not exceed 20 percent of its gross receipts; and (5) A majority of the
shareholders must be residing on the farm or actually engaging in farm-
ing.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24(2)(d) (West Supp. 1979). The qualified and family farm cor-
porations are defined so as to insure that ownership and control of land remains in the
individuals who actually work the land.
107. Ashbury Hospital, 326 U.S. at 214.
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qualified corporations are different from the agribusiness integrator.
These corporations are incapable of acquiring the extensive market
power of the integrator. This difference is the basis for protecting
these corporations but not the corporate integrator. Under the
Ashbury Hospital analysis, since these classes are in fact different,
the discrimination between them will be presumed relevant to a per-
missible legislative purpose.
Since the farm acts have engendered very little equal protec-
tion litigation, it is anticipated that the additional restrictions on
production contracting such as those imposed by the Iowa act should
not present any additional equal protection problem. Restrictions
aimed specifically at prohibiting production contracting seek only to
insure that the named classes are functionally as well as legally
separate.'" Therefore, additional restrictions should not expose the
acts to any greater equal protection challenge.
The due process challenge to the farm acts was also decided by
the Ashbury Hospital case. That challenge involved the forced
divestment of agricultural land.1" As long as a corporation has a fair
opportunity to realize the land's value, the state may force the
divestment of unlawfully held land without violating due process of
law. 10
B. Commerce Clause Challenges
Although meeting equal protection and due process standards,
the state farm acts, especially with additional restrictions on produc-
tion contracting such as those proposed, may face a challenge under
the commerce clause."' Because the acts protect local economic
enterprise from competition on a national scale, they are subject to
challenge as restrictions on free commerce.1 2 Legislation that affects
both interstate and local business vis-a-vis that which restricts only
out-of-state enterprise, may survive commerce clause scrutiny if it is
108. Because the production contract is the functional equivalent of direct
ownership, see note 14 supra and accompanying text, without legally restricting the
production contract, there is no functional separation of the named classes.
109. See note 69 upra and accompanying text.
110. Id.
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
112. Professor Morrison suggests that commerce clause issues raise more
serious problems for the state farm acts than the due process-equal protection issues.
He points out that state legislatures are not afforded the broad discretion under the
commerce clause that they are under the due process clause. Under the commerce
clause, state acts must be tested against national interests and free trade. Morrison,
supra note 8, at 980.
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narrowly drawn.' The applicable commerce clause test was enun-
ciated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. "' Legislation that evenhandedly
regulates in favor of local interests, and which incidentally affects
interstate commerce, is valid unless the burden imposed on in-
terstate commerce is "clearly excessive" in relation to the putative
local benefits. 15 The Court in Pike went on to explain that the
tolerable burden depends on the nature of the local interest and on
whether that interest is promotable with a lesser impact on in-
terstate commerce. 16
Under the Pike analysis, it appears that the existing farm acts,
and potentially more restrictive acts, will survive commerce clause
challenges. The acts affect both foreign and domestic corporations
evenhandedly. Except for the exempted corporations, all corpora-
tions are prohibited from owning farm land and engaging in farming.
The burden imposed on interstate commerce vis-a-vis local benefits
can hardly be characterized as "clearly excessive." In view of in-
tegration's monopolistic tendency,"' environmental considerations,"6
effect upon farm-related business,"9 potential ramifications of labor
unionization in agriculture,"2 and the debilitating effect upon the
nuclear family absent this legislation,' the family farm acts do not
seem "clearly excessive" in relation to their effect on interstate
commerce. Furthermore, the local interests protected by the acts,
including economic, environmental, social, and familial interests, are
113. Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36, 100 S. Ct. 2009,
2015 (1980).
114. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
115. Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits .... If
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id.
116. Id.
117. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
118. See note 163 infra and accompanying text.
119. See note 175 infra and accompanying text.
120. See note 167 infra and accompanying text.
121. The family farm is one of the few remaining bastions capable of providing
an environment which will foster close family relations. These relations in turn foster
virtues central to American life. As Senator Gaylord Nelson indicated, the farm family
generates qualities of independence, industry, hard work, foresight and cooperation.
See note 46 upra and accompanying text. Without the family farm environment, its
associated close family and the qualities generated by that family will be lost.
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not capable of being promoted "with a lesser impact on interstate
activity."'" If these local interests are to be promoted, their present
effect upon interstate commerce will not only continue, but, with ad-
ditional restrictions on production contracting, will have more far-
reaching economic consequences. Judicial balancing in future con-
frontations will determine the amount of protection afforded these
local interests.
The test set forth in Pike was affirmed by the holding in Exxon
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland." Exxon argued that a Maryland
statute forcing divestiture of Exxon property violated the commerce
clause by unduly burdening interstate commerce and by controlling
interstate commercial activity not amenable to state regulation.12' In
discussing this commerce clause challenge, the Court stated that
even though the burden of a state regulation falls on interstate com-
panies, that by itself does not establish a commerce clause
violation. 1 5 The commerce clause protects the interstate market, not
particular interstate firms, from burdensome regulation.1"
The crux of the commerce clause analysis in Exxon Corp. was
whether a particular state act impedes the flow of goods from state
to state."= The family farm acts affect the production of goods, not
the flow of goods per se. At most, the acts affect the flow of goods
indirectly by regulating who may produce those goods. Farm pro-
duction under the independent family farmer presumably would con-
tinue if the farm had not been integrated. That produce would con-
tinue to flow into the interstate market via agribusiness buyers.
Therefore, the acts do not impede the interstate flow of goods.
Exxon also argued that the statute would interfere with the
"natural functioning of the interstate market" and would change the
122. Under the Pike analysis, the Court is simply balancing competing in-
terests. The interests of economically powerful agribusinesses whose economic
freedom is curtailed are balanced against the various economic, social, and familial fac-
tors surrounding the family farm. Presuming that the purpose of protecting these lat-
ter factors is legitimate, the question then becomes one of degree. I am suggesting
that, at least for the present, the balance weighs in favor of the family farm. See note
115 supra and accompanying text.
123. 437 U.S. 117 (1978). For a statement of the facts in Exxon Corp. see note
73 supra and accompanying text.
124. Id. at 125.
125. The Court continued, "[i]f the effect of a state regulation is to cause local
goods to constitute a larger share, and goods with an out-of-state source to constitute a
smaller share, of the total sales in the market-the regulation may have a
discriminatory effect on interstate comerce." Id. at 126 n.16.
126. Id. at 127-28.
127. See note 125 supra.
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market structure.'" In response, the Court held that "the Commerce
Clause [does not) protect the particular structure or methods of
operation in a retail market."'" Farm acts which incorporated provi-
sions against production contracting would be vulnerable to a
similar accusation since they would clearly affect the market struc-
ture. But that effect is not the determining factor for invalidating an
act under the commerce clause. The effect upon the interstate flow
of goods is of greater importance. Under the criteria set forth in
these cases,'3 ° restrictions on agribusiness contractual integration
meet commerce clause requirements.
VII. FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR INCREASED INTEGRATION
The necessity for additional family farm protection can only be
fully understood after considering those factors which make
economic integration feasible. The presence of integrated
agribusiness in the food production chain results from several fac-
tors. National policies favorable to large-scale production are as
responsible for the growth of integrated agriculture as any produc-
tion efficiency the agribusiness might possess.'"' National price and
income support programs for agriculture' 2 emerged as the major
federal farm policy following World War 1.13 Direct income
128. The crux of Exxon's claim was that regardless of whether the state had
interfered with the movement of goods in interstate commerce, the statute had in-
terfered "with the natural functioning of the interstate market," and would change the
market structure. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. at 127.
129. Id.
130. Besides Exxon Corp. and Pike, see also Connecticut v. Levi Strauss &
Co., 471 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D. Conn. 1979); Tober Foreign Motors v. Reiter Oldsmobile,
376 Mass. 313, 381 N.E.2d 908 (1978).
131. The growth of corporate agriculture is not inevitably nor simply a
product of efficiency, but it is rather a result of the emergence of national
policies favorable to large-scale enterprises. Some of these policies were
promulgated by corporate interest. Others, ostensibly at least, were for-
mulated in. the desire to protect the family farmer, but have the opposite
effect.
W. GOLDSCHMIDT, As You Sow at xlviii (1978).
132. The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 created the Federal Farm Board.
This was the first direct effort of government to influence farm prices. The Board's
failure is attributed to the 1930's depression. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
provided for production adjustments by limiting production. It was declared un-
constitutional and was replaced by the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act
of 1936 and then the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Amendments and additions
to these acts have been made every three to five years. Consequently, agriculture has
been under some type of farm commodity income support since the 1930's. WHO WILL
CONTROL U.S. AGRICULTURE?, supra note 3, at 10.
133. Id.
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payments to the farmer comprised a substantial portion of the
money available under these programs.'" These payments were
made in proportion to the size of individual farm operations and
volume of sales. This Department of Agriculture" policy was
designed to support the growth of large farms.'" Since larger farm-
ing operations received larger benefits than smaller farms," smaller
farms have not remained economically viable. Indeed, without this
governmental impetus, there would be twenty-four percent more
farms today and the average farm size would be nearly twenty per-
cent smaller."'
The economic arguments which condemn family farm legisla-
tion as being contrary to "the realization of economic optima in a
free market economy,"'I seemingly overlook these governmental in-
puts. Inputs from without the market place vitiate the function of
the free market. Despite views to the contrary, many agricultural
economists insist that one- or two-man farm operations are still size
efficient."' In light of this fact, it is perhaps appropriate to view
family farm legislation as a counterweight to balance economic
forces unleashed by governmental inputs. The assertion in opposi-
tion to the farm acts that the disappearance of the family farm is
proof of its inability to compete economically overlooks the effects
of market involvement by the government.
The government's price and income programs have provided
price certainty that has affected agricultural production indirectly
as well. Income stability promised by the programs has increased ac-
cess to capital markets."' Assured that commodity prices will not
fall below price support levels, lenders have been more willing to ex-
tend credit to those eager to accumulate farm land and to invest in
134. Direct income payments for feed grain, wheat, and cotton programs in
1970 made up about 89% of all governmental payments to farmers. In the 1971 fiscal
year, these programs accounted for about 46% of the total Department of Agriculture
budget. Id.
135. Hereinafter cited as USDA.
136. Heady, Externalities of American Agricultural Policy, 7 U. TOL. L. REV.
795, 811 (1975).
137. In 1970, 7.6% of all farms received 30.4% of all payments. WHO WILL
CONTROL U.S. AGRICULTURE?, supra note 3, at 10.
138. L. SCHERTZ, ANOTHER REVOLUTION IN U.S. FARMING? 62 (U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture, Agricultural Economic Report No. 441, 1979).
139. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
140. Hearings on S. 334, supra note 44, at 2.
141. WHO WILL CONTROL U.S. AGRICULTURE?, supra note 3, at 11.
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capital goods needed for large-scale farming."' Although an indirect
effect of federal programs, these lending practices have helped
transform agricultural production into a highly mechanized process.
Farm mechanization has in turn led to concentrated, single-
commodity production, a situation favorable to integration. "3
Just as USDA price and income support policies encourage
large-scale production and integration, the existing tax structure
does also. Tax rates for corporations are less than the rates for sole
proprietorships."" This fact has been an important incentive for the
incorporation of family farms, and insofar as the family farmer may
do so, he is not disadvantaged by this structure. On the other hand,
the capital gains tax policy has worked to the integrator's advan-
tage. "' Only in those states permitting direct integration, can the in-
tegrator take advantage of capital gains. The integrator is able to
adjust profits between the integrated stages."' It is advantageous
for integrators to shift profits down the integrated chain by in-
vesting at the production stage. Gains made at this level, as in the
sale of cattle, may fit the capital gains tax bracket. Consequently,
the capital gains policy has encouraged investment and expansion of
production resources, thereby furthering the concentration of pro-
duction at the small farm's expense.
Research As A Factor Behind The Growth Of Integration
Government support programs and tax laws are only two fac-
tors that promote larger farms and the integrated form of
142. Federal commodity programs have accelerated the shift to large farms by
supporting commodity prices and increasing the chances of significant price increases.
These programs have increased the confidence of people willing to accumulate land
and the willingness of lenders to extend credit to these kinds of people. L. SCHERTZ,
supra note 138, at 3.
143. See note 151 infra and accompanying text.
144. Except at low levels of income, the tax rates for corporations are less
than the rates for individuals. Therefore, farmers have an increased incentive to incor-
porate and not to elect use of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. L. SCHERTZ,
supra note 138, at 68.
145. Capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than ordinary income. Thus, the
more income that qualifies as a capital gain the lower the tax liability.
146. This is applicable, for example, where an integrated firm owns a cow
herd, a feedlot, and a slaughtering plant. The slaughtering plant and feedlot can be
operated with only minimal profits. All profits can be pushed down the integrated
chain and converted into capital by investments in breeding stock. When the cattle are
sold, any gain will be taxed at capital gains rates. P. RAUP, CORPORATE FARMING IN THE
UNITED STATES 11 (Scientific Journal Series Paper No. 8187, 1972), cited in, W.
GOLDSCHMIDT, As You Sow at xxxv at (1978).
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agriculture. Government sponsored research agencies have also fur-
thered the interests of corporate integrated farming at the expense
of the family farm.' 7 The original farm orientation of this research
has disappeared. The research is now directed toward agribusiness
interests. Business interests, particularly those of farm machinery
and farm chemical input companies, are asked to directly participate
in the research stages of mechanization projects. 4 " According to one
commentator, "the interests of agribusiness literally are designed
with the product. No one else is consulted."'49
The agribusiness orientation of research has had a marked ef-
fect on the continued existence of smaller farms. Of course, a few
research technologies such as hybrid .seeds and fertilizers can be im-
plemented on smaller as well as larger production units. For many
technologies, however, availability and adoptability are limited to
large production units. Modern machinery is an apt example. In crop
production and large-scale poultry, beef, dry lot dairy and hog con-
finement feeding units, the adoption of modern machinery and
technologies results in high cost/low volume or low cost/high volume
production.'"0 The advent of machinery and technologies has man-
dated that the size of production units be increased. In many
respects these technological advances are desirable. The concen-
trated production that results from their incorporation has,
nonetheless, spelled the demise for numerous small farms.
New technologies with high volume/low cost production have
mechanized farm production and have resulted in larger farms and
in concentrated single commodity specialization.' Today, one-half of
147. When American agricultural policy took root during the Civil War, it was
recognized that research and development must be provided for farmers. The Depart-
ment of Agriculture was established to provide programs for educating the rural
population and for commercializing the American farm. This research and training was
agrarian oriented. W. GOLDSCHMIDT, As You Sow at xxxviii-xxxix (1978).
148. Big buisness interests are asked to participate directly in the planning,
research and development stages of these projects. J. HIGHTOWER, HARD TOMATOES,
HARD TIMES: A REPORT OF THE AGRIBUSINESS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT ON THE FAILURE
OF AMERICA'S LAND GRANT COLLEGE COMPLEX 31 (1973), cited in, W. GOLDSCHMIDT, As
You Sow at xxxix (1978).
149. Id.
150. L. SCHERTZ, supra note 138, at 2.
151. This transformation of agriculture into a highly mechanized system
resulted in farms producing high volumes of only a single commodity. In egg produc-
tion, for instance, it is common for each farm to have more than 20,000 laying hens; in
broiler production each farm sells at least 60,000 chickens. The mechanization of
agriculture also resulted in a substantial reduction of farm labor. See generally Heady,
supra note 136, at 810.
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all cattle fed in this country are fed in 422 feedlots.'5' Five thousand
farms accounted for nearly seventy percent of United States egg
production; 16,000 farms accounted for ninety percent of broiler pro-
duction; 15-20 firms annually market between 50,000 to 200,000 hogs
and 5,000 farms accounted for ninety percent of turkey production."3
Federal price support and research policies which advance
technology and mechanization have played a significant role in
developing this concentrated production.
VIII. SUITABILITY OF THE CONCENTRATED
PRODUCTION UNIT FOR INTEGRATION
Mechanized farming, in large part resulting from federal
agricultural policies, demands large capital investment. The cor-
porate potential to generate excess capital is particularly valuable in
meeting these capital needs.' The family farmer acquires equity
capital mainly through savings while corporations have the advan-
tage of obtaining outside equity capital. This additional capital buys
capital-intensive machinery and this mechanization, in turn, gives
corporations a high-volume production capacity. This capacity is ap-
parent from the fact that the largest 50,000 farms in the United
States are responsible for more than one-third of all farm sales.'
55
The development of mechanized, high-volume capacity farming
makes integration particularly attractive to the corporate
agribusiness. Agribusinesses that are involved in food processing
and distribution can minimize their costs and inconvenience by buy-
ing and assembling farm products in large volume lots."" Integration
through production contracts becomes appealing to both the
152. Each of these cattle feedlots averages over 30,000 head per year. L.
SCHERTZ, supra note 138, at 4.
153. These are 1974 production statistics. Because of the trend toward concen-
trated production and integration, see note 42 supra, these figures could be higher to-
day. Each of the 5,000 turkey farms noted raised at least 3,200 birds. L. SCHERTZ,
supra note 138, at 6.
154. Corporate involvement in agriculture did not become a serious possibility
until capital-intensive mechanization and the increased size of production units made
the capital-accumulating potential of corporations valuable. Morrison, supra note 8, at
977.
155. L. SCHERTZ, supra note 138, at 1.
156. Increased concentration in food processing and distribution by integrated
firms may cause a commensurate increase in the size of farms and the concentration of
farm production. These firms desire to purchase agricultural products in large volume
lots. By integrating into the production stage, these processing and distributing firms
can control quality and quantity tightly. WHO WILL CONTROL U.S. AGRICULTURE?, supra
note 3, at 11.
19811
Billings: The Family Farm: Regulating Farm Act Avoidance Techniques Through
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1982
306 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol.16
agribusiness processor and the high-volume producer. The in-
tegrated coordination eliminates open market transaction risks for
both. The producer is assured that its products will be marketed at
the contractual price. The processor can make long-range processing
and marketing decisions based upon the contract's assured supply of
products. This integrated coordination ultimately enhances the par-
ticipants' ability to control market activity and price.
IX. THE EXTERNALITIES OF CONCENTRATED
PRODUCTION AND INTEGRATION
Concentrated production and agribusiness integration are
heralded by those who equate size with efficiency.' Conversely,
equally adamant arguments suggest that both farmers and domestic
consumers at-large would benefit from a family farm protection
policy which limited the size and growth of farms.5 ' Advocates of
the family farm protection policy indicate several factors that
counterbalance possible efficiencies in large-scale production. Cost
advantages for-large-scale livestock, poultry, and hog production are
partly offset by an increased incidence of disease."9 Large-scale crop
production is affected by additional costs which arise from space and
distance factors; energy costs being a primary factor. Energy
could become so expensive that it would alter existing labor, land,
and capital input proportions, thereby increasing the relative pro-
portions of labor and land to capital."" The present trend toward
157. See, e.g., L. SCHRADER, note 14 supra; L. SCHRADER, note 36 supra.
158. [Tlotal farm income would be greater with small farms . . . farm
employment, purchase of inputs in the community and off-farm income
generated within the community all decline with [increase in] farm size.
Consumer food costs are only slightly higher under smaller farms because
the value of farm products per se represents a minor portion of food costs
at retail. With medium sized family farms . . . [diomestic consumers at
large also would be benefited along with farmers by a family farm income
protection policy directed at limiting the size and growth of farms.
Heady, supra note 136, at 829-30.
159. WHO WILL CONTROL U.S. AGRICULTURE?, supra note 3, at 19.
160. Id.
161. The prospects of higher energy costs inject uncertainty into the future of
U.S. farming, particularly the way in which it will be organized and managed.
Transportation costs from producers to consumers will continue to rise with energy
costs. This could encourage a shift in production from the Southwest and Pacific
Northwest to producers closer to the more metropolitan, consumer centers of the
North. Energy costs will also stimulate farmers to adjust the mix of resources they
employ in farm production. Cost changes and the energy efficiencies of available
technologies will influence the use of these technologies which will in turn affect farm
size. L. SCHERTZ, supra note 138, at 79.
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larger and fewer farms undoubtedly would reverse should energy
costs continue to rise.
A. Environmental Externalities
The additional costs incurred by large-scale farmers are but a
fraction of the total cost to society that results from concentrated
industrial-type farming. When all of the externalities generated by
the system are considered, industrial-type farming has developed to
the point of being counter-productive and inefficient."2 This type of
farming utilizes increasing amounts of production inputs including
chemcial pesticides, herbicides, and inorganic chemical fertilizers
which generate larger amounts of environmental pollutants.", Soil
erosion increases because large-scale farmers develop massive un-
broken land tracts.'" Concentrated livestock production creates a
waste disposal and pollution problem unassociated with family size
farming. Large-scale livestock feedlots generate amounts of animal
wastes that present immediate environmental problems.' Large-
scale producers, instead of returning animal wastes to the soil, con-
tinue to depend upon inorganic fertilizers to maintain the soil's pro-
ductive capacity. 6' While many of the environmental externalities
may not be of concern to the integrator in the short-run, they repre-
sent costs associated with industrialized farming that inevitably
must be confronted.
B. Effect on Labor
Besides adverse environmental effects, large-scale corporate
farming also affects rural labor requirements. This could significant-
ly change existing farm labor relations. The mechanization of farms
162. "Policy makers, however, must realize that 'bigger' is not always 'better'
and in this case, the move to larger industrial farms is actually contraproductive and
inefficient when one considers the economic externalities emanating from such
developments." Heady, supra note 136, at 832.
163. See generally B. COMMONER, SCIENCE AND SURVIVAL (1966), cited in,
Heady, supra note 136, at 818 n.122.
164. Heady, supra note 136, at 819.
165. These problems include nitrate contamination of soil and ground water,
breeding of insects, odors, and disseminations of agents infectious to man and animals.
Rosenburg, Vertical Integration in the Cattle Feeding Industry and the Packers and
Stockyards Administration, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 935 (1976).
166. The possiblity that these inorganic inputs are depleting the natural fertil-
ity of farmland is currently being investigated. In 1949 it took 11,000 tons of fertilizer
to produce yields that in 1968 required 57,000 tons. B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE
150 (1971).
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with capital-intensive labor-saving devices has resulted in rural
depopulation and the loss of rural employment opportunities."7 But
the seeds of new agricultural labor relations have been sown which
could affect wages paid to laborers of integrated agribusinesses.
These laborers, including the two and one-half million workers
who constitute the largest block of disadvantaged workers in this
country, 8' are entirely excluded from labor protection provided by
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).'69 Bayside Enterprises,
Inc. v. NLRB 17' reflects a growing concern and realization that pro-
tection should be afforded to laborers in the agricultural industry. 7'
167. When a tractor draws a combine ... the farmer is employing hun-
dreds of hours of urban manpower. All who work in the tractor and farm
equipment plants, in fertilizer and pest-control chemical plants, and a fair
portion of those producing oil, steel and other ingredients for our
mechanical farms, are in fact part of the agricultural production team.
The farming sector of our economy appears to have dwindled remarkably,
when in fact a large portion are agriculturists working in the urban in-
dustrial environment. But of course the true irony of our agricultural
economy is that we promulgate labor saving devices . . . and create
thereby an army of low paid farm workers and a large pool of
unemployed.
W. GOLDSCHMIDT, As You Sow at xxxii (1978).
168. Many of the two and one-half million agricultural laborers are migrant
workers. The high degree of concentration in agricultural production is evident by the
fact that 800 organizations control the employment of 80% of these laborers. The low
wages paid to these workers are disadvantageous to family farmers since the family
farmer's income is determined in large part from the value of his labor input. Because
commodity prices are affected by wages, the family farmer who competes with low
paid workers receives less compensation for his work. W. GOLDSCHMIDT, As You Sow
at xxxvii-viii (1978).
169. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects labor union organiza-
tion and has been instrumental in increasing the power of the urban laborer through
organization. Agricultural laborers are prohibited from forming unions and thus are
excluded from the protection provided by the NLRA. This is apparently the result of
an attitude among legislators that the farmers needed the protection from the power
of organized labor. Id.
170. 429 U.S. 298 (1977).
171. Bayside Enterprises is a vertically integrated poultry business contract-
ing with 119 farms for the production of chickens. Bayside delivers the chicks to the
farmers and picks them up for processing nine weeks later. During the nine-week
period, the contract farmers feed the chicks with poultry feed delivered to their
feedlots by Bayside drivers. These drivers pick the feed up at Bayside's feedmill and
deliver it to individual farmers. Bayside argued that these drivers were "agriculture
laborers" as defined by the National Labor Relations Act, thus excluding these drivers
from the protection of the Act. The NLRB contended that these drivers were
"employees" as defined by the Act, "employees" having the protection of the Act and
given the right to unionize. The Court held that the status of these drivers was deter-
mined by the character of the work which they performed for Bayside and concluded
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Recognizing the right of laborers of integrated agribusinesses to
unionize could substantially affect food prices since prices partially
reflect labor costs. Any advantage that agribusinesses previously
had in keeping prices low as a result of low wages would be quickly
lost through unionization. Since the farmer who produces the com-
modity for the integrator resembles an employee, he eventually may
be afforded NLRA protection as well.172
C. Other Effects of Integration
The mode of commodity production has ramifications beyond
those classified as environmental or labor related. Production which
is extremely concentrated may overlook a necessary human element
since it tends to preclude participation by the family farm in the
production process.' The absence of this human element has been
expressed as follows:
when that crop grew, and was harvested, no man had
crumbled a hot clod in his fingers and let the earth sift
past his fingertips. No man had touched the seed, or
lusted for the growth. Men ate what they had not raised,
had no connection with the bread. The land bore under
iron, and under iron gradually died; for it was not loved or
hated, it had no prayer or curses."4
that these drivers resembled "employees" more than "agricultural laborers." Id. at
303.
172. The relegation of the farmer to an "employee" of the agribusiness is
evidenced by the lack of farm management control in the farmer. This lack of indepen-
dent farmer management is demonstrated by Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429
U.S. 298 (1977). Bayside contracted with farmers to raise the chickens it hatched. The
company provided the farmers with chicks, feed, medicine, supplies, and fuel and paid
them for raising the chickens until they were ready for slaughter and processing. Most
important, at no time could the farmer claim the chickens he was raising as his own,
for at all times Bayside retained title to the chickens. Bayside's attitude towards its
"independent" contract growers is insightful. Bayside argued that the activity on the
independent farms should be considered as "farming operations" of Bayside. This argu-
ment reflected Bayside's attitude toward the independence afforded the contract
grower. Its attempt to attribute the activity on the farm as its own productive activity
suggests that for practical purposes Bayside considered the farms directly integrated.
Indeed, Bayside's argument was supported by the "character of its control over the
raising of the chicks, its ownership of the chicks, its assumption of the risks of casualty
loss and market fluctuations, and its control over both the source and the destination
of the poultry." Id. at 302.
173. "A reasonable estimate of economic organization must allow for the fact
that, unless industry is to be paralyzed by recurrent revolts on the part of outraged
human nature, it must satisfy criteria which are not purely economic." R. TAWNEY,
RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM (1973).
174. J. STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939).
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The reality that human emotional factors influence productivity
and the longevity of a particular mode of production has been
demonstrated. One study has shown significant social and economic
differences between production organized on a small farm basis and
on a large-scale corporate basis. 7 s Because family farms support
more farmers and non-farm businessmen than the large-scale cor-
porate farm, a more cohesive and productive rural community
develops. Family farms create a social mood premised on feelings of
equality. This mood encourages participation in the local community.
The Arvin-Dinuba study demonstrated that large-scale produc-
tion promoted a large class of agricultural laborers, who typically
were landless, with low, insecure incomes."' There is no reason to
believe that the same kind of alienation between management and
labor that exists in the industrial sector will not develop between
farm workers and agribusiness employers. That alienation is already
manifested by a lack of economic and social interests on the part of
workers in the community.'77 The combination of these factors does
not nourish the cohesiveness and gentleness rightly attributed to
the family farm and farm community.
X. DEFICIENCIES OF EXISTING FAMILY FARM LEGISLATION
Externalities of concentrated production, and integration's
monopolistic tendency of eliminating markets essential to the family
farmer's viability resulted in a hue and cry among family farm ad-
vocates in state legisatures. The resultant legislative efforts were
not without effect as the family farm acts that emerged were suc-
175. The Arvin-Dinuba study demonstrated that the small farm community
supported nearly twice as many separate businesses as did the large-farm community,
since businesses such as implement dealers, hardware stores, lumber yards, and feed
stores required a large number of farm customers. The number of farm families in a
trade area also directly affects businesses like grocery stores, drug stores, and filling
stations. The study indicated that in the small-farm community, retail trade was
greater by 61%. Generally, small farm structure supports 20% more people in the
local community per dollar volume of agricultural production. Notwithstanding their
greater number, members of the small-community had a better average standard of
living. In the small-farm community, more than 50% of the breadwinners were in-
dependently employed businessmen, in the large-farm community the proportion was
less than one-fifth. Less than one-third of the breadwinners in the small-farm communi-
ty were agricultural wage laborers as compared to two-thirds of the breadwinners in
the large-farm community. In addition, the small-farm community provided more
recreational facilities, newspapers, churches, and civic organizations. W. GOLDSCHMIDT,
As You Sow, at 282-85 (1978).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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cessful in prohibiting direct ownership integration of family farms.
But, the acts fell short of preventing contract farming's functional
control of farms, an issue that necessarily needs addressing if the
social and economic attributes of the family farm are to be preserv-
ed. A review of the existing acts and their deficiencies may be
helpful in guiding future legislative efforts directed at regulating
the use of production contracts.
North Dakota enacted the first and most stringent of all farm
acts. The act prohibits all corporations from engaging "in the
business of farming or agriculture."'78 Corporations which owned
farm land when the act was passed were required to divest
themselves of the land within ten years."9 Farmland can be acquired
by corporations through judicial process or operation of law (mor-
tgage, lien, or other encumbrance held by the corporation) but this
land will escheat to the state if the corporation does not divest itself
within ten years."s
Ashbury Hospital'' demonstrates the effectiveness of the act
in preventing corporate integration or involvement in farm produc-
tion. But the act's means of preventing corporate involvement are
perhaps too restrictive. The act does not allow for incorporation of
the family farm. This can adversely effect the family farm because it
deprives the farmer of the tax advantages associated with incor-
poration.' In this respect, the act perhaps is overinclusive. Never-
178. North Dakota's act exempts only cooperative cooperative corporations
from this provision, see note 102 supra, but otherwise provides "[apl corporations both
domestic and foreign, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, are hereby pro-
hibited from engaging in the business of farming or agriculture." N.D. CENT. CODE §
10-06-01 (1976) (enacted in 1932).
179. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
180. In case any corporation, either domestic or foreign, violates any
provision of this chapter or fails, within the time fixed by this chapter, to
dispose of any real estate to which it has acquired title and which is not
reasonably necessary for the conduct of its business, then title to such
real estate shall escheat to the county in which such real estate is
situated upon an action instituted by the state's attorney of such county,
and such county shall dispose of the land within one year at public auction
to the highest bidder, and the proceeds of such sale, after all expenses of
such proceedings shall have been paid, shall be paid to the corporation
which formerly owned the land.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-06-06 (1976).
181. Ashbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945).
182. See Kelley, The Farm Corporation as an Estate Planning Device, 54 NEB.
L. REV. 217 (1975); Kelly, Estate Tax Reform and Agriculture, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 897
(1976).
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theless, the act's stringent provisions protect against agribusiness
integration into farm production.
The Iowa and Kansas acts' constraint on contract farming has
been previously discussed.'83 The Iowa act is the only farm act which
specifically addresses contract farming. The Oklahoma act, however,
explicitly permits contract farming by integrators.'8 4 Wisconsin's
act 8' focuses on the prohibition of corporate land ownership, not on
the prevention of indirect control of farm production.8 The act only
goes so far as to declare "those farming operations prohibited ...
are the production of dairy products [and] the production of cattle,
hogs and sheep . 1.."87 Corporations are prohibited from owning
land on which to carry on these activities but no provision is ad-
dressed to indirect corporate production control where the corpora-
tion does not own the land.
Missouri's act'88 is similar to Wisconsin's as it narrowly focuses
on land ownership without addressing potential contract farming
issues. Its restrictive provision declares, "nor shall any corporation,
directly or indirectly, acquire, or otherwise obtain an interest,
whether legal, beneficial or otherwise, . . . any title to agricultural
land in this state."'89 This note has demonstrated that title to the
land is not synonomous with farmer control of the production
resources. 90 For this reason both the Missouri and Wisconsin acts
are ineffectual in preserving family farm independence.
For the same reason, South Dakota's act'' is ineffectual in
preventing contract farming. The South Dakota act, like the
Oklahoma act, invites integration. The South Dakota act's restric-
tions on corporate land ownership do not apply to "lands acquired
by a corporation solely for the purpose of feeding livestock."'92 The
processor of livestock is unequivocally vested with the right to in-
tegrate into livestock production. Although the South Dakota
legislature recognized "that the existence of the family farm is
183. See notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text.
184. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
185. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 182.001 (West Supp. 1981).
186. "No corporation or trust may own land on which to carry on farming
operations .... Id.
187. Id. at § 182.001(3).
188. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 350.010 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
189. Id. at § 350.015.
190. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
191. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-9A-1 (Supp. 1981).
192. Id. at § 47-9A-11.
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threatened by conglomerates in farming," '193 its subsequent act did
little to expell that threat.
Finally, Minnesota's farm act,"' while also being land-ownership
oriented, additionally declares that "no corporation shall engage in
farming." '95 The act defines farming as the production of
agricultural, livestock, milk, and fruit products.9 The act does not
indicate, however, whether "production" encompasses indirect pro-
duction through contracts. Accordingly, the majority of the state
farm acts are ineffective in protecting the family farmer. Only with
additional provisions specifically addressed to production contrac-
ting will that protection be afforded.
XI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Although the existing farm acts protect the family farm from
direct agribusiness integration, they do not protect against direct in-
tegration's functional equivalent, the production contract. To meet
this deficiency, the existing farm acts could be amended with the
bill which the author has set out in the appendix. The author
believes this bill's total prohibition on the use of production con-
tracts is the only approach that will insure the family farmer's con-
tinued viability. In order to redevelop an open market system of
commodity transaction and to reallocate production and marketing
control, the production contract must be prohibited.
Section one of the bill is a declaration of policy. The policy
focuses on the anticompetitive and monopolistic potential of integra-
tion. The focus is not on the family farm per se in order to avoid ac-
cusations that family farm legislation is "social" and therefore
"short-lived" legislation. The policy concentrates instead on the
adverse economic effects of integration. Section two also provides
specific provisions regarding production contracting. The provisions
explicitly prohibit indirect production through production contracts.
Further restrictions are set out in order to avoid any attempt by
agribusinesses or farmers to establish a contract arrangement,
though not calling that arrangement contractual. These restrictions
193. "The legislature of the state of South Dakota recognizes the importance ot
the family farm to the economic and moral stability of the state, and the legislature
recognizes that the existence of the family farm is threatened by conglomerates in far-
ming." Id. at § 47-9A-1.
194. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24 (West Supp. 1981).
195. Id. at § 500.24(3).
196. Id. at § 500.24(2)(a).
19811
Billings: The Family Farm: Regulating Farm Act Avoidance Techniques Through
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1982
314 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol.16
specify that commodities must be purchased through negotiation in
the open market.
Section two also provides an exemption for cooperative cor-
porations and for those contracts in existence at the time of the
bill's enactment. The farm cooperative is exempt only if seventy-five
percent of its members are actually farmers. This insures that the
cooperative is farm based and will genuinely support the interests
of farmers. The cooperative is exempted because it is an organiza-
tion that can develop bargaining power to confront agribusiness
buyers. Existing contracts are also exempted in order to avoid con-
stitutional challenges involving impairment of contracts.
Section three is a definition section. The most significant defini-
tion is 'production contract.' Production contracts include contracts
and "contractual-type relations." The broad term "contractual-type
relations" is incorporated in order to encompass production ar-
rangements which may not be strictly contractual, but are in the
nature of a contract. The term is used in anticipation of
agribusinesses' attempt to circumvent the bill with techniques not
strictly defined as contractual.
Section four provides for civil penalties for violators. Addi-
tionally, part (b) of section four gives the court power to dissolve
unlawful contracts and to allocate the civil penalty according to a
party's deliberateness in violating this law. Additionally, part (b)
protects those parties without knowledge that their activities are in
violation of the law.
CONCLUSION
The family farm acts were passed in response to the perceived
threat which integrated agribusiness posed to the family farmer.
However, integrators can circumvent the farm acts with indirect
production techniques such as the production contract. Despite the
integrator's power to eliminate traditional open markets, by replac-
ing them with a manipulatable "non-price" coordinated system, Iowa
is the only state that has specifically sought to restrain indirect in-
tegration.
Although the Iowa act has not been constitutionally challenged,
similar provisions in the North Dakota act have passed due process
and equal protection challenges. None of the farm acts have been
tested on commerce clause grounds. Commerce clause standards, as
established in recent cases, suggest that the farm acts meet com-
merce clause requirements.
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The necessity for additional restrictions on production contract-
ing can only be fully understood after considering factors from
without the free market which instigated the family farm's demise.
Federal price and income support policies made large farms larger
while eliminating smaller family farms. Lenders, encouraged by
price stability, were more eager to lend to larger expanding
farmers. Research policies designed to concentrate commodity pro-
duction, support large-scale corporate production. Mechanized
industrial-type farming, with its extremely concentrated production,
in turn is highly suitable for integration.
Before policymakers can make an informed decision on the
issue of integration, the externalities of integration must be con-
sidered. Environmental factors, integration's effect on labor rela-
tions, and the Arvin-Dinuba social and economic findings must be
considered. Policymakers have opted for the family farm alternative
but have failed to protect against production contracting. To make
that choice functionally, as well as legally meaningful, the existing
farm acts should be amended to include the concept embodied in the
following proposal.
Alan L. Billings
APPENDIX
A Bill
To amend the existing state corporate farm law to provide ad-
ditional regulation of anticompetitive and socially and economi-
cally harmful developments in the agricultural industry.
Section 1. Findings and Declaration of Policy
(a) The Legislature finds that-
(1) in order to preserve free and private enterprise,
prevent monopoly, and protect consumers, it is necessary
to prevent indirect control of agricultural production
through the employment of production contracts;
(2) vertical integration through production contract-
ing in the agricultural industry by persons, limited part-
nerships, and corporations engaged in processing,
marketing, distributing, and retail industries, tends to
create monopolies in the agricultural industry, to foster
anticompetitive trade practices in that industry, and to
result in unfair competition for the family farmer;
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(3) the participation of integrated firms within
agricultural commodity production through production
contracting will lead to the demise of the family farm
capable of fostering values central to our society;
(b) The Legislature declares that it is the policy of this
state and the purpose of this Bill to restore competition to
the production facet of agriculture by prohibiting produc-
tion contracting and to provide for the continued ex-
istence of the family farm.
Section 2. Restrictions on Production Contracting
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
no person, limited partnership, or corporation engaged in
processing, marketing, distributing, or retail industries
shall-
(1) engage directly or indirectly in' farming or the
production of any agricultural products through the
employment of production contracts;
(2) participate in farming through vertical integration
or by means of acquision or control of another person who
is engaged in farming;
(3) acquire ownership or control of any agricultural
products except by negotiation in the open market with
the farmer who has produced the commodity;
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall
not apply to-
(1) any cooperative corporation or association,
seventy-five percent of whose members or stockholders
are actual farmers residing on farms or depending prin-
cipally on farming for their livelihood;
(2) any contract in existence at the time of this Bill's
enactment between any person, limited partnership or
corporation engaged in processing, marketing,
distributing, or retailing and any farmer engaged in the
production of any agricultural commodity, provided that
the contract is not altered thereafter in order to extend
the duration of the contract.
Section 3. Definitions
For purposes of this Bill-
(1) the term 'agricultural product' means any un-
processed grain, fruit, vegetable, milk, poultry, eggs, hogs,
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sheep, cattle, cotton, tobacco, rice, tree nuts, hay, or other
forage, potatoes, or peanuts;
(2) the terms 'agricultural production' and 'farming'
mean the use of land for the production of any
agricultural product;
(3) the term 'production contract' means any contract
or contractual-type relation in which the processor,
marketer, distributer, or retailer controls or attempts to
control the conditions under which the farmer must pro-
duce the commodity or controls or attempts to control the
price or marketing of the agricultural product regardless
of the duration of any such contract or contractual-type
arrangement.
Section 4. Civil Penalty For Violation
(a) Whoever violates section 2 (a) of this Bill shall be sub-
ject to a civil penalty not to exceed [ ] per day that such
person, limited partnership, or corporation is in violation
of this section.
(b) If any contract or contractual-type arrangement has
been entered in violation of section 2 (a) of this Bill, the
court shall dissolve the contract in a way which is fair and
equitable to all parties and may penalize parties according
to their knowledge of the violation and deliberate attempt
to circumvent this Bill so long as such penalty shall not
exceed the amount provided in subsection (a) of this sec-
tion of this Bill.
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